Coffee Break: Iraqi prisoner abuse outlines bad management

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Clarrissa French is Springfield Business Journal editor.|ret||ret||tab|

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Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba's report on Iraqi prison operations and abuses under the 800th Military Police Brigade outlines a stunning failure of management.|ret||ret||tab|

The military known for its strict regimens, attention to detail and order royally messed up on this one.|ret||ret||tab|

It's a cautionary tale for anyone who runs a business or manages people.|ret||ret||tab|

It is important to note that most members of the 800th MP Brigade did the best job they could with what they had, and Taguba specifically praised some battalions and individuals in the 800th for excellent performance and support of Army ideals in spite of poor leadership. |ret||ret||tab|

It was primarily individuals in the 372nd MP Company of the 320th MP Battalion, part of the 800th MP Brigade, that were involved in the reported abuses. |ret||ret||tab|

For clarity, a company is 100 to 200 soldiers and a battalion is made up of two to six companies. A brigade is typically made up of two to four battalions. The 800th MP Brigade has eight battalions.|ret||ret||tab|

Stress was high and morale was low in the 800th MP Brigade. Mortar attacks, random rifle fire and rocket-propelled grenade attacks were commonplace. Abu Ghraib, in particular, was severely overcrowded, not just with enemy prisoners of war, but also with Iraqi criminals. |ret||ret||tab|

Iraqi guards at the prison were as much a hindrance as a help, in some cases furnishing inmates with contraband, weapons and, in one case, facilitating a detainee escape.|ret||ret||tab|

Add to this a management void, and the stage is set for bad business:|ret||ret||tab|

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Training for the job|ret||ret||tab|

The 800th MP Brigade received no preparation or training on internment/relocation operations not before deployment, at the mobilization site, upon their arrival or at any time during their mission. |ret||ret||tab|

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Staffing|ret||ret||tab|

According to Taguba, Army doctrine dictates that a single battalion should be able to handle about 4,000 detainees. Abu Ghraib typically housed 6,000 to 7,000 detainees under a single battalion.|ret||ret||tab|

Taguba also noted that personnel were poorly distributed. |ret||ret||tab|

While a single battalion was overseeing up to 7,000 prisoners at Abu Ghraib, a whole battalion also oversaw the High Value Detainee Facility at Camp Cropper, which had only 100 prisoners.|ret||ret||tab|

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Established procedures|ret||ret||tab|

There was an almost complete lack of detailed standing operating procedures at any of the detention facilities.|ret||ret||tab|

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Who's in charge?|ret||ret||tab|

During the period when most of the abuses occurred, Abu Ghraib was under the tactical control of the commander of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade. This, Taguba states, "effectively made a military intelligence officer, rather than an MP officer, responsible for the MP units conducting detainee operations at that facility." |ret||ret||tab|

Apparently, the commander of the 205th MI Brigade, Col. Thomas M. Pappas, and the commander of the 800th MP Brigade, Brig. Gen. Janis Karpinski, did not discuss the order giving the 205th commander tactical control not among themselves or with their personnel. Both continued as if they were in charge of detention. If the commanders didn't know who was in charge, how could the soldiers? Oddly enough, Karpinski is a corporate consultant in her civilian life.|ret||ret||tab|

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Review and corrective action|ret||ret||tab|

Following escapes and riots, no after-action reviews were conducted to identify problems and disseminate lessons learned to the soldiers so the soldiers could take corrective action.|ret||ret||tab|

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Accurate accounts|ret||ret||tab|

No one, including Karpinski, could provide an accurate number of escapes from the prisons in the brigade's area of responsibility. Documentation shows 27 escapes or attempted escapes; Karpinski claimed there were more than 32.|ret||ret||tab|

Because of a shortage of personnel to process paperwork, there was sometimes a lapse of up to four days between the time a detainee was transferred to a new location and the time that transfer was recorded in the detainee manifest.|ret||ret||tab|

Also, besides escapees, there was no accounting of "ghost detainees," persons brought to the 800th Brigade by "other government agencies." Not only did the soldiers of the 800th Brigade not account for these prisoners, they did not know their identities or even the reason for their detention. |ret||ret||tab|

At one point, Taguba notes, the 320th MP Battalion hid a group of these detainees from a visiting International Committee of the Red Cross survey team, a violation of international law.|ret||ret||tab|

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Following up|ret||ret||tab|

Recommendations to address escapes and accountability lapses were ordered implemented by Karpinski, but there is no evidence that the majority of those orders were followed. Also, there was no follow-up by command to verify that corrective action was taken. Had command followed up, Taguba states, subsequent problems, including prisoner abuse, might have been prevented.|ret||ret||tab|

There is a lesson to be learned here, and not just by the military. |ret||ret||tab|

As managers and employers, we should all ask ourselves: Are my employees adequately trained and prepared? Do they know their responsibilities and limitations? Do I provide clear policies and procedures? Is information up to date and clearly communicated? When mistakes are made, do I correct them and make sure they won't be repeated? |ret||ret||tab|

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